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 11. Introduction 
 
Cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions are introduced in Aubin (1974). Such games 
are helpful for approaching sharing problems arising from economic situations where 
agents have the possibility to cooperate with different participation levels, varying from 
non-cooperation to full cooperation, and where the obtained reward depends on the 
levels of participation. A fuzzy coalition describes the participation levels to which each 
player is involved in cooperation. Classical cooperative games, which model situations 
where agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation with some 
other agents, can then be seen as a simplified version of games with fuzzy coalitions. In 
the pioneering work of Aubin the focus was on the core of cooperative fuzzy games and 
on the Shapley value. Since 1974 much research has been done in the field of 
cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions. For a survey the reader is referred to Nishizaki 
and Sakawa (2001). As in the classical cooperative game theory, some classes of games 
with fuzzy coalitions deserve special attention. The class of convex fuzzy games is 
introduced in Branzei et al. (2002) together with the notion of participation monotonic 
scheme (pamas), the existence of which is assured by the convexity of the game. Some 
additive and monotonic rules on the convex cone of convex fuzzy games are also 
considered (Proposition 8, in Branzei et al. (2002)). In the classical cooperative game 
theory extensive attention is paid to monotonicity properties of solution concepts (see 
Young (1985), Moulin (1988), Sprumont (1990), Branzei et al. (2001), Tijs et al. (2001), 
Voorneveld et al. (2000)). Additivity of rules on specific cones of cooperative TU-games is 
also an important research topic (see Shapley (1953), Dragan et al. (1989), Branzei and 
Tijs (2001), Tijs and Branzei (2002)).   
In this paper we introduce a new class of games with partly fuzzy coalitions, namely 
the class of fuzzy clan games (and its subclass of fuzzy big boss games,) and focus on the 
core and bi-monotonic allocation schemes and rules. Inspired by Branzei et al. (2001) 
and Voorneveld et al. (2000) who consider the notion of bi-monotonic allocation scheme 
(bi-mas) for classical total big boss and total clan games, respectively, we introduce here 
for fuzzy clan games the notion of bi-monotonic participation allocation scheme 
(bi-pamas). Big boss games and clan games are introduced in classical cooperative game 
theory by Muto et al. (1988) and Potters et al. (1989), respectively; see also Tijs (1990). 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly recall some 
notions and facts from the theory of games with fuzzy coalitions. The notion of fuzzy 
clan game is introduced and exemplified in Section 3. Further, in Section 4, the cores of 
a fuzzy clan game (and a fuzzy big boss game, respectively) and its restricted games are 
 2explicitly described and the geometrical shape of the core is discussed. 
Compensation-sharing rules and the notion of bi-participation monotonic allocation 
scheme (bi-pamas) are introduced in Section 5. It turns out that each 
compensation-sharing rule is additive, stable and generates for each game a bi-pamas, 
and each core element of a fuzzy clan game is bi-pamas extendable. We conclude with 
some final remarks in Section 6. 
 
2. Preliminaries on games with fuzzy coalitions 
 
Let   be a finite set of players. A fuzzy coalition on   is a vector 
 in [ , where the   coordinate    is referred to as the participation 
level of player   in the fuzzy coalition 
} ,..., 1 { n N =
) ,..., n s 0
i
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s. The set of fuzzy coalitions on   is denoted 
by  and also by  . A crisp coalition    corresponds in a canonical way to the 
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. The fuzzy coalition   corresponds to the situation where the players in   
fully cooperate (i.e. have participation level 1) and the players outside   are not 
involved at all in cooperation (i.e. they have participation level  ). Instead of   we 
often write  . The fuzzy coalition 
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) 0 ,..., 0 ( 0 =  is called the "empty" fuzzy coalition and 
the fuzzy coalition    is called the "grand" coalition.    ) 1 ,..., 1 ( =
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A cooperative fuzzy game with player set   is a function  , with  N R F v
N → : 0 ) 0 ( = v , 
assigning to each fuzzy coalition a real number telling what such a coalition can achieve 
in cooperation. The set of games with fuzzy coalitions on   is an infinite dimensional 
linear space that we denote by  .  
N
N FG
The core (Aubin (1974)) of a fuzzy game    is defined by    v
} each   for      ) (    ), ( | { ) ( ∑ ∈ ≥ ∑ = ∈ =
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Here    is the inner product of  ∑
∈N i
i ix s s and  x, denoted by  x s⋅   in the following.   
For each fuzzy game   we define its corresponding crisp game   by 
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In Branzei et al. (2002) the notion of t -restricted game of   is introduced, which 
plays a role similar to that of a subgame of a crisp game (see Remark 4 in Branzei et al. 
(2002)). 
v
Let   and  . In what follows for each   we denote the set 
 by car . The t -restricted game of   with player set   is the gamev  
with   given by   for all  , where t . For 
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By means of restricted games Branzei et al. (2002) have extended the notion of 
population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) for cooperative crisp games (Sprumont 
(1990)) to that of participation monotonic allocation scheme (pamas) in the context of 
cooperative fuzzy games. Convexity of the fuzzy game (and its restricted games) is a 
sufficient condition for the existence of a pamas. 
 
3. The cone of fuzzy clan games 
  
There are various economic situations where the group of agents involved consists of 
two subgroups with different status: a "clan" whose members can "manage" the 
situation and a set of available agents willing to join the clan. However, the non-clan 
members are completely dependent on the collective of clan members in the sense that   
a coalition never can obtain a positive reward if not all clan members are present in the 
coalition. Such situations are modeled in the classical theory of cooperative games with 
transferable utility by means of (total) clan games where only the full cooperation and 
non-cooperation at all of non-clan members with the clan are taken into account. Here 
we take over this simplifying assumption and allow non-clan members to cooperate with 
all clan members and some other non-clan members to a certain extent. As a result the 
notion of fuzzy clan game is introduced. 
Let   be a finite set of players. We denote the non-empty set of clan 
members by  , and treat clan members as crisp players. In the following we denote the 
set of crisp subcoalitions of   by  , the set of fuzzy coalitions on   by 
 (equivalent to  ), and denote [  by  . For each  , 
 and   will denote its restriction to   and  , respectively. We denote the 
vector   by 1  in the following. Further we denote by   the set [  
of fuzzy coalitions on   where all clan members have full participation level, and 
where the participation level of non-clan members may vary between 0 and 1. 
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 In this section fuzzy clan games are defined using veto power of clan members, 
monotonicity, and a condition reflecting the fact that a decrease in participation level of 
a non-clan member in growing coalitions containing at least all clan members with full 
participation level results in a decrease of the average marginal return of that player 
(DAMR-property). 
Formally, a game   is a fuzzy clan game if  satisfies the following three  v
 4properties: 
(i) (veto-power of clan members)  0 ) ( = s v  if  ;  C C s 1 ≠
(ii) (Monotonicity)   for  all   with  ) ( ) ( t v s v ≤
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Property (i) expresses the fact that the full participation level of all clan members is a 
necessary condition for generating a positive reward for coalitions. 
Fuzzy clan games for which the clan consists of a single player are called fuzzy big
boss games, with the single clan member as the big boss. 
 
As an introduction we give two examples of interactive situations one of them leading 
to a fuzzy clan game, but the other one not. 
 
Example 1. (A production situation with owners and gradually available workers). Let 
. Let   be a monotonic non-decreasing 
function with 
} , , 1 { }, , , 1 { \ n m C m C N L L + = =
0 ) 0 (
R f
C N →
\ ] 1 , 0 [ :
= f
R v
C C N → × } 1 , 0 { ] 1 , 0 [ :
\
 and with the decreasing average marginal return property. 
Then   defined by  0 ) ( = s v
C
 if   and   
otherwise, is a fuzzy clan game with clan  . 
C C s 1 ≠ ) , , , ( ) ( 2 1 m s s s f s v L =
 One can think of a production situation where the clan members are providers of 
different (complementary) essential tools needed for the production and the production 
function measures the gains if all clan members are cooperating with the set of workers 
 (cf. Chetty et al. (1976), Potters et al. (1989)), where each worker   can 
participate at level    which may vary from lack of participation to full participation. 
C N \ i
i s
 
Example 2. (A fuzzy voting situation with a fixed group with veto-power). Let   and 
  be as in Example 1, and 
N
C C N k \ 0 < < . Let   with  R v
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i C C . 
Then    has the veto power property for members in    and the monotonicity property, 
but not the DAMR-property with respect to members of  , hence it is not a fuzzy 
clan game. This game can be seen as arising from a voting situation where to pass the 
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 should exceed a fixed threshold  , where s  (s ) correspond to full 
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In the following the set of all fuzzy clan games with a fixed non-empty set of players 
  and a fixed clan    is denoted by  . We notice that    is a convex cone in 
, that is for all   and  ,  , where   denotes 
the set of non-negative real numbers. 
C FCG
N
C FCG w v ∈ , + ∈R pv ∈ + R
Now we show that for each game   the corresponding crisp game   is a 
total clan game if 
N
C v∈ w
2 ≥ C , and a total big boss game if  1. 
Let  . The corresponding crisp game   has the following properties which 
follow straightforwardly from the properties of  : 
N
C FCG v∈ w
v
(V)   if C ;  0 ) ( = S S ⊂ /
(M)  for  all   with  (where   means   for  each 
); 
) ( ) ( T w S ≤ T S, N S ⊂ ⊂ ⊂ T i∈
(TC) for all   with C  and  each  T S, T S ⊂ ⊂ C S i \ ∈ ,  }) { \ ( ) ( }) i T w T w i − ≥ − . 
So,   is a total clan game in the terminology of Voorneveld et al. (2000) if  , 
and a total big boss game in the terminology of Branzei et al. (2001) if  . 
w 2 | | ≥ C
1 | | = C
In the following we consider t -restricted games corresponding to a fuzzy clan game 
and prove, in Proposition 1, that these games are also fuzzy clan games. 
Let   and  . Recall that the t -restricted game   of    with respect to 
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Proof.  First, note that for each   with   we have  , and then 
the veto-power property of   implies  . To prove the monotonicity 
property, let   with  . Then  , where the 
inequality follows from the monotonicity of  . Now, we focus on the DAMR-property 
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 6where the inequality follows from the DAMR-property of  .  (Q.E.D.)  v
 
For each  ,   andt , let   be the element in   such that 
 for each   and  . The function v  
is called  oordinate-wise concave regarding non-clan members if for each  the 
function   with   for  each 
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i → − ] 1 , 0 [ :
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t t ( ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x   is a concave function. 
The function   is said to have the submodularity p operty on 
 if   for all  , where 
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C C N → × } 1 , 0 { ] 1 , 0 [ :
\
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 are those 
elements of [ with the i   coordinate equal, for each i , to 
max{  and  min{ , respectively. 
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(The operations   and   play a similar role for fuzzy coalitions as the union and 
intersection for crisp coalitions.) 
∨ ∧
 
Remark 1. The DAMR-property regarding non-clan members implies two important 
properties of  , namely coordinate-wise concavity and submodularity. Note that the 
coordinate-wise concavity follows straightforwardly from the DAMR-property of  . The 
proof of the submodularity follows the same line as in the proof of Theorem 6 in Branzei 
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N
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It is well known that for a concave real-valued function each tangent line to the graph 
lies above the graph of the function. Based on this property we state 
Lemma 1. Let  ,  , and 
N
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Proof. Applying the coordinate-wise concavity of    and the property of tangent lines to 
the graph of   in   one  obtains  .  
(Q.E.D.) 
v
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 74. The core of fuzzy clan games 
 
The main aim of this section is to provide an explicit description of the core of a fuzzy 
clan game and give some insight into its geometrical shape. We start with a lemma.   
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where the inequality follows from the submodularity property of  applied for each 
. Now for each    we have by Lemma 1 
v
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Now we combine (1) and (2).    (Q.E.D.) 
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 8We use now the monotonicity property and the coordinate-wise concavity property of   
obtaining that   exists and this limit is equal to  . 
Hence  , thus implying that   is a subset of the set on the right side 
of the equality in ( ). 
v
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The inequality    follows then from Lemma 2.    (Q.E.D.)  ) (s v x s ≥ ⋅
 
The core of a fuzzy clan game has an interesting geometric shape. It is the intersection 
of a simplex with 'hyperbands' corresponding to the non-clan members. To be more 
precise, for fuzzy clan games (and fuzzy big boss games with  ), we have  0 ) ( =
n e v
) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( 1 v B v B e v v Core m
N ∩ ∩ ∩ ∆ = L , where    is the simplex    )) ( (
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is the region between the two parallel hyperplanes in  ,   and 
, which we call the ‘hyperband’ corresponding to  . 
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, which corresponds to the point with a central location in 
this geometric structure. Note that   is in the intersection of middle-hyperplanes of 
all hyperbands  ,  , and it has the property that the coordinates 




Example 3. For a 3-person fuzzy big boss game with player 3 as the big boss and 
 the core has the shape of a parallelogram ( in the imputation set) with 
vertices: 
0 ) (
3 = e v
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Note that    is the middle 
point of this parallelogram. 
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N N N N N e v D e v D e v e v D e v D v b + − =
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For a convex fuzzy game the core of    and the core of the corresponding crisp game   
coincide (see Theorem 7 (iii) in Branzei et al. (2002)). This is not the case in general for 
fuzzy clan games as the next example shows. 
v w
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The next lemma plays a role in the rest of the paper. 
 
Lemma 3. Let  . Let   and   be the t -restricted game of  . Then for 
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Theorem 2. Let  . Then for each   the core   of the t -restricted 
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Proof.    We only prove (i). Let  , with 
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a fuzzy game,  . Since 
 and since, by Proposition 1,   is itself a fuzzy clan game, we can apply 
Theorem 1(i), thus obtaining 
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Now we apply Lemma 3.    (Q.E.D.) 
 
 
5. Monotonic allocation rules and bi-pamas 
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We call this rule the  ompensation-sharing rule with compensation vecto   c r α  and 
sharing vector β . The i  coordinate   of the compensation vector  th - i α α  indicates 
that player   obtains the part   of his marginal contribution 
 to  . Then for each 
} ,m i L
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β  determines the share  ( ) for the clan member i  from 
what is left for the group of clan members in  . 
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,   is additive on the cone of fuzzy clan games. The stability follows from Theorem 1.   
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Note that    is the fuzzy coalition where each non-clan member has participation 
level 0 and each clan-member has participation level 1. We have 
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where the first inequality follows from the DAMR-property of   by  taking 
,  ,  , the second inequality follows from Lemma 1 with 
 and  , and the third inequality since    in view of the 
monotonicity property of  . Hence (3) holds. 
Inequality (3) expresses the fact that the group of clan members is left a non-negative 
amount in the grand coalition.   
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N
C FCG w v ∈ ,
Conversely, let  . Then 
N
C FCG w v ∈ ,
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∆ ∈ ∈ + =
∆ ∈ ∈ + = +
β α ψ β α ψ
β α ψ ψ
β α ψ
β α β α
β α β α
β α
 
where the equalities follow from (ii).    (Q.E.D.) 
 
For fuzzy clan games the notion of bi-monotonic allocation scheme which we introduce 
now plays a similar role as pamas for convex fuzzy games in Branzei et al.(2002). 
Let  . A scheme [  is called a bi-monotonic participation allocation
scheme (bi-pamas) for    if the following conditions hold: 
N
C FCG v∈
N i F t i t N
C
b
∈ ∈    , ,
1 ]  
C
v
(i) (Stability)   for  each  ;  ) ( ) ( , t N i i t v Core b ∈ ∈
N F t 1 ∈
 12(ii) (Bi-monotonicity w.r. . participation levels)  For  all   with  t
C
N F t s 1 , ∈ t s ≤  we  have: 
i t i i s i b t b s ,
1
,
1 − − ≥  for  each i ) ( ) \ ( s car C N ∩ ∈ ;  • 
i t i s b b , , ≤  for  each i .  C ∈ • 
 
Remark 2. The restriction of   to a crisp environment (where only the crisp 
coalitions are considered) is a bi-monotonic allocation scheme according to Branzei et al. 
(2001) for the case 
N i F t i t N
C
b
∈ ∈    , ,
1 ] [
1 = C , and Voorneveld et al. (2000); see also Grahn (2002). 
 




C F t s 1 , ∈ t s ≤  and let  ) (s car i∈  be a non-clan 
member. Then  .  ) (t ) ( v D s v D i i ≥
Proof.  , where the 
inequality follows from the DAMR-property of  , with  .  (Q.E.D.) 
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Theorem 4. Let v , with 
N
C FCG ∈ } ,..., 1 { \ m C N = . Then for each   and 
m ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ α
}) ,n L , 1 ({ ) ( m C + ∆ = ∆ ∈ β  the  compensation-sharing  rule   generates  a 
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Proof.  We treat only the case  1 > C . In Theorem 2(i) we have proved that for each 
 the  core Core  of  the  t -restricted game    is given by 
N F t 1 ∈
C ) ( t v t v




t ∈ ≤ ∈ ≤ ≤ = ∑ ∈ =
∈
. 
Then, for each non-clan member   the  i α -based compensation (regardless of  β ) in the 
“grand coalition”   of the  t -restricted game   is  . Hence, 
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i i i i t v D t v β ψ
β α } ,n {m + ∈ . 
 First we prove that for each non-clan member   the compensation per unit of 
participation level is weakly decreasing when the coalition containing all clan members 
with full participation level and in which player    is active (i.e. ) becomes larger. 
i
i 0 > i s
Let   with 
N F t s 1 , ∈
C t s ≤  and  ) \ ( ) ( C N s car i ∩ ∈ . We have 
 13,   ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
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, 1 1
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t i i i
N
t i i i i t i i i
s i i i
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where the inequality follows from Lemma 4 and the second and third equalities by 
Lemma 3. Hence, for each   with 
N F t s 1 , ∈
C t s ≤   and each non-clan member    ) (s car i∈
) ( ) (
, 1 , 1
t i i s i i v t v s
β α β α ψ ψ
− − ≥ . 
 Now, denote by   the  ) ( t v Rα α -based remainder for the clan members in the “grand 
coalition”   of  the  t -restricted game  . Formally,    t t v
∑ − = ∑ − =






t t t v D t v e v D e v v R
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) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( α α α . 
First we prove that for each   with 
N F t s 1 , ∈
C t s ≤   
) ( ) ( s t v R v R α α ≥        ( 4 )  
Inequality (4) expresses the fact that the remainder for the clan members is weakly 
larger in larger coalitions (when non-clan members increase their participation level). 
Let   with 
N F t s 1 , ∈
C t s ≤ . Then 
,   ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
)   ) ( ( ) (





∑∑ − ≥ − ≥
∑∑ − + − ≥


























t v D s t t v D s t
e s t s v D s t
e s t s v e s t s v s v t v
α
 
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the second inequality from   










k k k s v D s s v t v D s s v t v D t t v
1 1 1
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( α α α
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4. So, we proved that   for 
all   with 
) ( ) ( s t v R v R α α ≥
N F t s 1 , ∈
C t s ≤ . 
  Now note that inequality (4) implies that for each clan member the individual share (of 
the remainder for the whole group of clan members) in  , that is  , is weakly 
increasing when non-clan members increase their participation level.    (Q.E.D.) 
t v ) ( t i v Rα β
 
 In crisp game theory a prominent class of total big boss games is the class of holding 
games (cf. Tijs et al. (2000)). In the next example we consider a fuzzy approach to 
holding situations leading to a fuzzy big boss game. 
 
Example 5. Let agents 1 and 2 have goods to be stored and let agent 3 possess a holding 
 14house with capacity 1. Agents 1 and 2 at activity level   and  , respectively, want to 
store   and, respectively,   units with corresponding benefit 10  and  . This 
economic situation leads to a fuzzy game with 
1 s 2 s
}
1 s 2 s 1 s 2 4s
3 , 2 , 1 { = N
, 1 s s
,   for  all 




) 0 , 2 =
) 1 = − s
, ( 1 s s v
1 ( 4 + ] 1 , 2 1 s s
2 1 + s s
, 0 [ ∈
1 >
2 1 2 1 10 ) 1 , , ( s s s v = 4s + 1 2 1 ≤ + s s 4 + v 10 1 s ) 1 , ( 2 =
  One can easily check that this is a fuzzy big boss game with player 3 as a big boss. The 
bi-pamas  corresponding to the compensation-sharing rule where 
players 1 and 2 obtain half of their marginal contribution is given by: b ; 
; , if  , and  ;  ;  , if . 
} 3 , 2 , 1 {    , , } 3 , 2 , 1 {
} 3 { 1 ] [
∈ ∈ i F t i t b
2 1 3 , 2 5 t t bt + =
1 1 , 5t t =
1 2 > + t 2 2 , 2t bt = 1 2 1 ≤ + t t 1 1 , 3t bt = 0 2 , = t b 4 3 1 3 , + = t bt 1 t
 
Let   and  . Then we call 
N
C FCG v∈ ) (v Core x∈ x  bi-pamas extendable if there exists a 
bi-pamas   such that   for each i
N i F t
N
C ∈ ∈    , 1 i t b , ] [ i i e x b N =
, N ∈ . In the next theorem we show 
that each core element of a fuzzy clan game is bi-pamas extendable. 
 
Theorem 5. Let   and 
N
C FCG v∈ ) (v Core x∈ . Then  x  is bi-pamas extendable. 
 
Proof.   Let  . Then, according to Theorem 3 (ii),  ) (v Core x∈ x  is of the form  . 














6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper games of the form   are considered, where the players 
in   have participation levels which may vary between 0 and 1, while the players in 
 are crisp players in the sense that they can fully cooperate or not at all. Special 
attention is given to a subclass of such games, which we call fuzzy clan games, where the 
clan members are the crisp players. For the class of fuzzy clan games we have focused on 
the core (Aubin (1974)) and on bi-monotonic participation allocation rules and schemes 
that are introduced in this paper. In Tijs et al. (2002) we have paid attention to other 
cores (the proper core, the dominance core and the crisp core) and stable sets for fuzzy 
clan games. For crisp clan and big boss games properties of other solutions and their 
relations are studied, namely: the bargaining set, the kernel, subsolutions, the Shapley 
value, the nucleolus, and the 
R v
N N → ×
2 1 } 1 , 0 { ] 1 , 0 [ :
1 N
2 N
τ -value (Potters et al. (1989), Muto et al. (1988)). A topic 
 15for further research could be to introduce for games with (partly) fuzzy coalitions 
solutions corresponding to the kernel, the bargaining set and subsolutions, and to study 
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